






Taxation, Entrepreneurship, and 
Wealth 
 












































 Taxation, Entrepreneurship, and Wealth∗
Marco Cagetti
Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System
Mariacristina De Nardi
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, NBER, and University of Minnesota
Abstract
Entrepreneurship is a key determinant of investment, saving, and
wealth inequality. We study the aggregate and distributional eﬀects of
several tax reforms in a model that recognizes this key role and that
matches the large wealth inequality observed in the U.S. data. The ag-
gregate eﬀects of tax reforms can be particularly large when they aﬀect
small and medium-sized businesses, which face the most severe ﬁnancial
constraints, rather than big businesses. The consequences of changes in
the estate tax depend heavily on the size of its exemption level. The
current eﬀective estate tax system insulates smaller businesses from the
negative eﬀects of estate taxation, minimizing the aggregate costs of re-
distribution. Abolishing the current estate tax would generate a modest
increase in wealth inequality and slightly reduce aggregate output. De-
creasing the progressivity of the income tax generates large increases in
output, at the cost of large increases in wealth concentration.
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tutions for helpful comments. The views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, The Federal Reserve Board, the Federal
Reserve System, or the National Science Foundation.
01 Introduction
Given the well-known trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and redistribution, the ef-
fects of taxation on economic inequality and capital accumulation have long
been a concern for economists and policy makers. Despite the relevance of this
topic, very few papers study this question in the context of quantitative models
capable of matching the extreme concentration of wealth observed in the data.
This is because constructing such a model, computing it, and calibrating it to
the data are not easy tasks. (See Quadrini and R´ ıos-Rull [33] for a discussion.)
Entrepreneurship is a key determinant of investment, saving, wealth hold-
ings, and wealth inequality. (See Quadrini and R´ ıos-Rull [34], Quadrini [31]
and [32], and Gentry and Hubbard [16].) In previous work (Cagetti and
De Nardi [10]) we have developed and calibrated a life-cycle model with en-
trepreneurial choice, and we have shown that our model reproduces very well
the key features of the data. In this paper we use such a setup to assess
the long-run eﬀects of various tax policies on entrepreneurial choices, saving,
investment, and wealth inequality in the U.S. economy.
We ﬁnd that abolishing the estate tax generates a modest increase in wealth
inequality. If everything else is held ﬁxed, the abolition of the estate tax in-
creases output by 1.4%. But if the income tax is raised to balance the govern-
ment budget constraint, the positive eﬀect on aggregate output is reversed, and
output is reduced by 0.5%. This latter experiment thus generates a modest
increase in wealth inequality, a drop in aggregate output, and a redistribution
from most of the households to the richest ones.
We also ﬁnd that increasing the estate tax rate is an eﬀective instrument
to reduce inequality and that the costs and beneﬁts of such reduction crucially
depend on the exemption level. Our results indicate that the current eﬀective
1exemption level is high enough and that raising it further would not decrease
wealth inequality and would be detrimental for aggregate output production.
We measure the current exemption level using information on the fraction of
estates that pay the tax, thereby taking into account the vast opportunities to
avoid the estate tax that are present in the current system.
Our simulations also indicate that decreasing progressivity signiﬁcantly
stimulates entrepreneurial savings and capital formation, but at the cost of
a signiﬁcant increase in wealth inequality.
The key forces driving our results are linked to occupational choice, saving
behavior of the workers, and investment, saving, and borrowing behavior of the
entrepreneurs. Overall, we ﬁnd that the fraction of the population devoted to
entrepreneurship does not change much as a result of the various tax policies
that we consider, but that the aggregate response of output, capital formation,
and wealth inequality derived from changes in saving and investment behavior
can be big. We draw several general conclusions from our simulations. First,
a given policy aﬀects the households in our economy diﬀerently, depending on
their wealth level, age, and degree of entrepreneurial ability. Hence, the net
outcome of the policy is a complex combination that depends on the fraction of
people that are aﬀected in a particular way, and on their saving and investment
elasticities as a response to the given policy change. Second, since changes in
the proportional income tax that we use to balance the government budget
constraint aﬀect the majority of households, and the entrepreneurs that are
most borrowing constrained in particular, even a small change in such tax
can have large aggregate eﬀects, capable of reversing the intended eﬀects of
a given reform. (See the abolition of the estate tax as an example.) One
crucial aspect of each of the tax policies that we consider is how it aﬀects the
large fraction of small and medium-sized businesses, rather than the few really
2big ones. Lastly, general equilibrium eﬀects, and changes in the equilibrium
interest rate in particular, can have large eﬀects and, in some cases, reverse the
sign of the eﬀects of a reform carried out in partial equilibrium, both for the
aggregates and for wealth inequality. This is because the equilibrium interest
rate represents both the return to saving for workers and the opportunity cost
of investment (that is, the cost of borrowing for the entrepreneurs). In many
of our experiments a raise in the equilibrium interest rate increases aggregate
savings by the workers, but decreases the fraction of investment carried out by
the entrepreneurs even more and could thus lower aggregate output. A change
in the interest rate can also have sizable implications for wealth inequality.
In particular, an increase in the interest rate tends to lower wealth inequality
through two channels: First, it tends to raise the saving and wealth holdings of
the non-entrepreneurial households, who tend to be poorer. Second, it tends to
lower investment, proﬁts, and assets holdings of the entrepreneurs, who tend
to be the richest, thus shrinking wealth concentration.
Our ﬁndings are based on a life-cycle model with occupational choice,
in which some households have the ability to employ capital more produc-
tively than others, and potential and existing entrepreneurs face borrowing
constraints because contracts are imperfectly enforceable.
Several studies have examined entrepreneurship and wealth inequality. Our
framework builds on Quadrini’s [32] model of wealth inequality by endogenizing
the ﬁrm size distribution, the interest rate at which ﬁrms borrow and lend,
and the amount of borrowing as a function of the entrepreneur’s collateral,
and by modeling the life-cycle and the intergenerational linkages. Meh [29]
uses Quadrini’s framework to study the eﬀects of switching from progressive
to proportional income taxation.
Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, and R´ ıos-Rull [12] construct a model with no
3occupational choice, in which the earnings process is calibrated to match cross-
sectional features of the U.S. earnings and wealth inequality. Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-
Gim´ enez, and R´ ıos-Rull [11] use this framework to study the eﬀects of switching
from a progressive to a proportional income tax system.
There is a large literature on the eﬀects of taxation on business investment,
recently reviewed by Hassett and Hubbard [20], and on the eﬀects of taxation
on inequality, such as Saez [36], who analyzes the eﬀects of optimal progressive
capital income taxation on wealth inequality in a partial equilibrium model in
which the initial distribution of wealth is exogenous. Bhattacharya [7] develops
a theoretical model to study bequest taxes when borrowing is limited by costly
state veriﬁcation. In our work, we study how the various eﬀects of taxation
quantitatively interact in a general equilibrium model in which the distribution
of wealth and entrepreneurial choice are related because of the presence of
borrowing constraints.
2 Empirical evidence on entrepreneurship,
borrowing constraints, and wealth
Entrepreneurship is a key determinant of investment, saving, wealth holdings,
and wealth inequality. We summarize here some of the key facts about en-
trepreneurship and its role in shaping wealth inequality.1
First, entrepreneurs are a small fraction of the population (about 10%),
but hold a large share of total wealth (about 40%) and have a higher saving
rate than non-entrepreneurs (Gentry and Hubbard [16] and Quadrini [31]).
1See Cagetti and De Nardi [10], Quadrini and R´ ıos-Rull [34], Quadrini [31] and [32],
Budria, D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, Quadrini, and R´ ıos-Rull [35], Gentry and Hubbard [16], Buera [9],
and Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen [30] for more on entrepreneurship.
4Top % 1 5 10 20
Whole population
percentage of total net worth held 30 54 67 81
Entrepreneurs
percentage of households in a given percentile 63 49 39 28
percentage of net worth held in a given percentile 68 58 53 47
Table 1: Entrepreneurs and the distribution of wealth.
Table 12 shows that, while the distribution of wealth is extremely concentrated
in the hands of a small fraction of households, entrepreneurs constitute a large
fraction of the richest households and own a large fraction of wealth even
among the richest. The households in the top 1% of the wealth distribution
hold around 30% of total net worth, and those in the top 5% hold more than
half of the total. More than 60% of the households in the top 1%, and almost
one-half of those in the top 5%, are entrepreneurs, and they hold, respectively,
68% and 58% of the wealth held by households in those quantiles.
Second, many papers have argued that households are not free to borrow
as much as they would like to enter entrepreneurship or to expand their ex-
isting business activity, and therefore have to partly self-ﬁnance. One’s own
assets thus play a crucial role in determining who becomes an entrepreneur
and how large his business activity is. Intergenerational transfers are also
fundamental, because they may allow some households to enter entrepreneur-
2The data come from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The results for the
1992 and 1995 waves are similar. We classify as entrepreneurs the households who declare
owning a privately held business (or a share of a privately held business), who have an active
management role in it, and who have invested a positive amount of wealth in such business.
This is consistent with the deﬁnition of entrepreneur that we use in our model. At any
rate, in our previous paper we show that our results do not change if we use self-declared
employment status (self-employed) to identify entrepreneurs.
5ship, either by continuing the parents’ activity or by starting a new business.
Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen [21] study the eﬀects of receiving a bequest
on potential and existing entrepreneurs. The households in their sample are
rich. Contrary to the intuition that only the poor might face borrowing con-
straints, the paper shows that, even in their sample, the receipt of a bequest
(and thus an increase in wealth) increases the probability of starting a busi-
ness and that existing sole proprietors who receive a bequest not only are more
likely to stay in business, but also experience a substantial increase in the en-
terprise’s receipts. Their explanation for this ﬁnding is that entrepreneurial
businesses are undercapitalized because of liquidity constraints. Evans and Jo-
vanovic [13] estimate a structural model of self-employment and ﬁnd evidence
of liquidity constraints. Evans and Leighton [14] ﬁnd that the probability
of switching into self-employment increases with asset ownership.3 Gentry
and Hubbard [16] analyze SCF data and argue that costly external ﬁnancing
(coupled with potentially high returns on those investments) has important
implications for the saving, investment, and entry decisions of continuing and
potential entrepreneurs.
Another feature of the data that is interpreted by many as evidence of
borrowing constraints is that the portfolios of entrepreneurs, even the richest
ones, are very undiversiﬁed: business wealth constitutes a large share of the
entrepreneur’s total wealth, and even the entrepreneur’s own assets are often
used as collateral. (See Cagetti and De Nardi [10] and Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jørgensen [30].)
The evidence thus suggests that entrepreneurs face borrowing constraints
and that the possibility of becoming entrepreneurs and the level of possible
3More recently, however, Hurst and Lusardi’s [23] ﬁndings seem to indicate that this cor-
relation is probably more important for the richest than for the poor would-be entrepreneurs.
6borrowing are related to the level of the entrepreneurs’ wealth. The need
to accumulate assets in the presence of such constraints may also generate
high saving rates among entrepreneurs (or households planning to become
entrepreneurs). These features of the data stress the importance of studying




We adopt a life-cycle model with intergenerational altruism. To make the
results quantitatively interesting, we need short time periods. To make the
model computationally manageable, we have to keep the number of stages
of life small. To reconcile these two necessities, we adopt a modeling device
introduced by Blanchard [8] and generalized by Gertler [17] to a life-cycle
setting.
Our model period is one year long. Households go through two stages of
life, young and old age. A young person faces a constant probability of aging
during each period (1 − πy), and an old person faces a constant probability
of dying during each period (1 − πo). When an old person dies, his oﬀspring
enters the model, carrying the assets bequeathed to him by the parent.
Appropriately parameterized, this framework generates households for which
the average length of the working period and the retirement period is realistic.
There is a continuum of households of measure 1.
73.2 Preferences
The household’s ﬂow of utility from consumption is given by c1−σ
1−σ . The house-
holds discount the future at rate β and are perfectly altruistic toward their
descendants.
3.3 Technology
Many ﬁrms are not controlled by a single entrepreneur and are not likely
to face the same ﬁnancing restrictions that we stress in our model. There-
fore, as in Quadrini [32], we model two sectors of production: one popu-
lated by the entrepreneurs and one by non-entrepreneurial ﬁrms. The non-
entrepreneurial sector is represented by a standard Cobb-Douglas production
function F(Kc,Lc) = AKα
c L1−α
c , where Kc and Lc are the total capital and
labor inputs in the non-entrepreneurial sector and A is a constant. In both
sectors, capital depreciates at a rate δ.
Each person possesses two types of ability, which we take to be exoge-
nous, positively correlated over time, and uncorrelated with each other. En-
trepreneurial ability (θ) is the capacity to invest capital more or less produc-
tively. Working ability (y) is the capacity to produce income out of labor.
Workers can save (but not borrow) at a riskless, constant rate of return.
Entrepreneurs can borrow and invest capital in a technology whose return
depends on the entrepreneurs’ own entrepreneurial ability: those with higher
ability levels have higher average and marginal returns from capital. When the
entrepreneur invests some working capital k, production net of depreciation is
(1−δ)k+θkν and 0 < ν < 1. Entrepreneurs thus face decreasing returns from
investment, as their managerial skills become gradually stretched over larger
and larger projects. Hence, while entrepreneurial ability is exogenously given,
8the entrepreneurial rate of return from investing in capital is endogenous and
is a function of the size of the project that the entrepreneur implements.
We assume that the entrepreneurs work on their own project without hiring
labor and that all of the workers are hired by the non-entrepreneurial sector.
In equilibrium the prices are given by the marginal products of each factor
of production, and the rate of return from investing in capital in the non-
entrepreneurial sector must equate the risk-free rate that equates savings and
investment.
3.4 Credit market constraints
As in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn [3], Kehoe and Levine [24], and Marcet
and Marimon [28], the borrowing constraints are endogenously determined
in equilibrium and stem from the assumptions that contracts are imperfectly
enforceable.
Imperfect enforceability of contracts means that the creditors will not be
able to force the debtors to fully repay their debts as promised, but that the
debtors fully repay only if it is in their own interest to do so. Since both
parties are aware of this feature and act rationally, the lender will lend to a
given borrower an amount (possibly zero) that will be in the debtor’s interest
to repay as promised.
In particular, we assume that the entrepreneurs who borrow either can
invest the money and repay their debt at the end of the period or can run
away without investing it and be workers for one period. In the latter case,
they retain a fraction f of their working capital k (which includes own assets
and borrowed money) and their creditors seize the rest.
In the absence of market imperfections, the optimal level of capital is
9only related to technological parameters and does not depend on initial as-
sets. In our framework, instead, the higher the amount of the entrepreneur’s
own wealth invested in the business, the larger the amount that the borrower
would lose in case of default. Hence, the lower the incentive to default, and the
larger the sum that the creditor is willing to lend to the entrepreneur. Hence,
the entrepreneur’s assets act as collateral, but the loan is not necessarily fully
collateralized.
As a result, not all potentially proﬁtable projects receive appropriate fund-
ing. Households with little wealth can borrow little, even if they have high
ability as entrepreneurs. Since the entrepreneur forgoes his potential earnings
as a worker, he will choose to become an entrepreneur only if the size of the
ﬁrm that he can start is big enough, that is, if he is rich enough to be able to
borrow and invest a suitable amount of money in his ﬁrm.
3.5 Government and taxation
The government is inﬁnitely lived. It levies taxes, pays a pension p to each
retiree, provides a certain level g of public expenditures, and pays interest
on the accumulated debt. During every period, tax revenues from income,
consumption, and estate taxes are equal to government expenditures, pension
payments, and interest payments on the debt. We focus on the steady states
and assume that the debt level is ﬁxed.
We model progressive taxation of total income (as in Altig and Carl-
strom [5]), and we allow the tax schedules to be diﬀerent for entrepreneurs
and non-entrepreneurs (including workers and retirees). We adopt Gouveia
and Strauss’ [19] functional form and assume the average federal tax rate τi(y)
10on total income Y is given by




where i = e,w: entrepreneurs and workers. Gouveia and Strauss [19] have
shown that this functional form is ﬂexible enough to approximate well the
eﬀective average tax rate. As explained in the calibration section, we esti-
mate the parameters bi, si, and pi from microeconomic data, separately for
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs.
Total income taxes paid by each household are given by
Ti(Y ) = τi(Y )Y + τsY,
where τs captures state and other income taxes (other than federal). The gov-
ernment also levies a sales tax on consumption, at a constant rate τc. Estates
larger than a given value exb are taxed at rate τb on the amount in excess of
exb.
3.6 Households
At the beginning of each period, the current ability levels are known with
certainty, while next period’s levels are uncertain. Each young individual starts
the period with assets a, entrepreneurial ability θ, and worker ability y and
chooses whether to be an entrepreneur or a worker during the current period.
An old entrepreneur can decide to keep the activity going or retire, while
a retiree cannot start a new entrepreneurial activity.
113.6.1 The young’s problem
The young’s value function is
V (a,y,θ) = max{Ve(a,y,θ),Vw(a,y,θ)}. (2)
The function Ve(a,y,θ) is the value function of a young individual who
manages an entrepreneurial activity during the current period. To invest k,
the young entrepreneur borrows (k − a) from a ﬁnancial intermediary at the
interest rate ¯ r, which is the risk-free interest rate at which people can borrow
and lend in this economy. The young entrepreneur’s problem is thus
Ve(a,y,θ) = max
c,k,a′{u(c) + βπyEV (a
′,y
′,θ





ν − δk − ¯ r(k − a) (4)
a
′ = Ye − Te(Ye) + a − (1 + τc)c (5)
u(c) + βπyEV (a
′,y
′,θ
′) + β(1 − πy)EW(a
′,θ
′) ≥ Vw(f · k,y,θ) (6)
a ≥ 0 (7)
k ≥ 0. (8)
The term Ye represents the entrepreneur’s total proﬁts. The expected value
of the value function is taken with respect to (y′,θ′), conditional on (y,θ). Eq.
(6) determines the maximum amount that an entrepreneur with given state
variables can borrow. The term W(a′,θ′) is the value function of the old
entrepreneur at the beginning of the period, before deciding whether to stay
in business or retire. The term Vw(a,y,θ) is the value function if he chooses
12to be a worker during the current period. We have
Vw(a,y,θ) = max
c,a′ {u(c) + βπyEV (a
′,y
′,θ
′) + β(1 − πy)Wr(a
′)} (9)
subject to eq. (7) and
Yw = ¯ wy + ¯ ra (10)
a
′ = (1 + ¯ r)a − Tw(Yw) − (1 + τc)c, (11)
where ¯ w is the equilibrium wage rate.
3.6.2 The old’s problem
Since the old entrepreneur can choose to continue the entrepreneurial activity
or retire, his state variables are his current assets a and his entrepreneurial
ability level θ. His value function is given by
W(a,θ) = max{We(a,θ),Wr(a)}, (12)
where We(a,θ) is the value function for the old entrepreneur who stays in
business, and Wr(a) is the value function of the old retired person. Deﬁne
a′









subject to eq. (5), eq. (8), and
u(c) + βπoEW(a
′,θ




′) ≥ Wr(f · k). (14)
13The child of an entrepreneur is born with ability level (θ′,y′). The expected
value of the child’s value function with respect to y′ is computed using the
invariant distribution of y, while the one with respect to θ′ is conditional on
the parent’s θ and evolves according to the same Markov process that each
person faces for θ while alive. This is justiﬁed by the assumption that the
child of an entrepreneur inherits the parent’s ﬁrm.
A retired person (who is not an entrepreneur) receives pensions and social
security payments (p) and consumes his assets. His value function is
Wr(a) = max
c,a′ {u(c) + βπoEWr(a





subject to eq. (7) and
a
′ = (1 + ¯ r)a + p − Tw(p + ¯ ra) − (1 + τc)c. (16)
The expected value of the child’s value function is taken with respect to the
invariant distribution of y and θ.
3.7 Equilibrium
Let x = (a,y,θ,s) be the state vector, where s distinguishes young workers,
young entrepreneurs, old entrepreneurs, and old retired. From the decision
rules that solve the maximization problem and the exogenous Markov pro-
cess for income and entrepreneurial ability, we can derive a transition function
M(x,·), which provides the probability distribution of x′ (the state next pe-
riod) conditional on x.
14A stationary equilibrium is given by

     
     
a risk free interest rate ¯ r and wage rate ¯ w
taxes (Tw(.), Te(.),τc, τb, exb) and social security payments p
allocations c(x),a(x), occupational choices, and investments k(x)
and a constant distribution of people over the state variables x: m∗(x)
such that, given ¯ r, ¯ w, and government taxes and transfer schedules:
• The functions c, a, and k solve the maximization problem described
above.
• The capital and labor markets clear. Total labor supplied by the work-
ers equals the total labor employed in the non-entrepreneurial sector.
Total household savings in the economy equal the sum of the total capi-
tal employed in the non-entrepreneurial and entrepreneurial sectors plus
government debt.
• The marginal product of labor and the marginal product of capital (net
of depreciation) in the non-entrepreneurial sector are equal to ¯ w and ¯ r.
• The government budget constraint balances at every period: government
debt is constant and total taxes collected equal government expenditure,




∗(x) = pπr+g+¯ rD.
The integral is over all of the population, Io is an indicator function that
is equal to one if the person is old and zero otherwise, and πr is the
fraction of retired people in the population.
15• The term m∗ is the invariant distribution for the economy.
4 Calibration
Tables 2 and 3 list the parameters of the model. Table 2 lists the parameters
that we take as given and do not use to match model-generated moments with
moments in the data.
We take the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion to be 1.5, a value close to
those estimated, among others, by Attanasio et al. [6]. As is standard in the
business cycle literature, we choose a depreciation rate δ of 6% and the capital
share in the non-entrepreneurial production function of .33. The probability
of aging and of death are such that the average length of the working life is 45
years and the average length of the retirement period is 11 years. The logarithm
of the income y process for working people is assumed to follow an AR(1). We
take its persistence to be .95, as estimated, for instance, by Storesletten et al.
[39]. The variance is chosen to match the Gini coeﬃcient for earnings of .38,
the average found in the PSID. We assume that the income process and the
entrepreneurial ability processes evolve independently; the exact values for the
income and ability processes are described in Appendix A. The social security
replacement rate is 40% of average gross income. (See Kotlikoﬀ et al. [26].)
The average of the ratio between government expenditure and GDP over
1990-99 was 18.7% (Economic Report of the President, 2000).
As in Altig et al. [4], we take the tax rate on consumption to be 11%. The
ratio of total indirect taxes to personal consumption expenditure in the NIPA
accounts has been quite stable around 11%-12% from 1989 to 1999.
We pick the level of government debt (as a fraction of output) so that,
given the equilibrium interest rate, every period the total interest payments
16on government debt equal 3% of output (as in Altig et al. [4]).
We estimate the parameters of the tax function on total income using PSID
data for 1989. See Appendix B for details. Figure 1 displays our estimated
average tax rates as a function of total income for the whole population and
for the subpopulations of entrepreneurs and workers.





























Figure 1: Estimated average tax rates for the whole population, workers, and
entrepreneurs.
Table 3 lists the remaining parameters of the model and their correspond-
ing values in the baseline calibration. We consider only two values of en-
trepreneurial ability: zero (no entrepreneurial ability) and a positive number.
This implies that Pθ is a two-by-two matrix. Since its rows have to sum to
one, this gives us two parameters to calibrate. We also have to choose values
for ν, the degree of decreasing returns to scale to entrepreneurial ability, f,
the fraction of working capital the entrepreneur can keep in case he defaults,
the estate tax rate, and its corresponding exemption level.
In total, these are eight parameters to be used to match eight moments of
the data. We use the ﬁrst six to pin down the following moments generated
by the model: the capital-output ratio, the fraction of entrepreneurs in the
population, the fraction of entrepreneurs exiting entrepreneurship during each
17Parameter Value Source(s)
Preferences, technology, and demographics
σ 1.5 Attanasio et al. [6]
δ .06 Stokey and Rebelo [38]
α .33 Gollin [18]
A 1 normalization
πy .98 average working life: 45 years
πo .91 average retirement life: 11 years
Labor income process and social security payments
y,Py see appendix A Huggett [22], Lillard et al. [27]
p 40% average yearly income Kotlikoﬀ et al. [26]
Public expenditure, government debt, and taxes
g 18.7% GDP NIPA
D see text Altig et al. [4]
τc 11% Altig et al. [4]
bw .32 our estimates
be .26 our estimates
sw .22 our estimates
pw .76 our estimates
pe 1.4 our estimates
se .42 our estimates










Table 3: Calibrated parameters.
period, the fraction of workers becoming entrepreneurs during each period, the
ratio of median net worth of entrepreneurs to that of workers, and the fraction
of people with zero wealth.
We choose the other two to match the revenue from estate and gift taxes
(0.3% of output) and the fraction of the estates that pay estate taxes (1.5%).
Our eﬀective tax rate on estates turns out to be 16%, which is much smaller
than the statutory tax rate (of the order of 40%-60%). Our exemption level
turns out to be 150 times the average labor income for the workers (about $5
million), compared with $650,000 in the tax schedule. (See Aaron and Gale [1]
for a description of the statutory estate tax rates.) In practice there are many
ways to avoid or reduce the burden of estate taxation (Aaron and Munnell [2]
and Kopczuk et al. [25]) and thus have a much higher eﬀective exemption level
and a much lower eﬀective marginal tax rate.





























Figure 2: Distribution of wealth
for the whole population. Dash-
dot line: data; solid line: baseline
model.





























Figure 3: Distribution of wealth for
the entrepreneurs. Dash-dot line:
data; solid line: baseline model.
Capital- Percentage wealth in the top
output Wealth Perc. Perc.
ratio Gini entr. 1% 5% 20% 40% at zero
U.S. data
3.0 .78 10-11.5% 30 54 81 95 14%
Model
3.0 .82 10.5% 30 61 86 95 14%
Table 4: Baseline calibration.
5 Results
Even though we do not calibrate our model to match the observed distribu-
tion of wealth, our framework with entrepreneurial choice produces a very
impressive ﬁt of the observed wealth distribution, both for the wealth hold-
ings of the whole population, and for those of the entrepreneurs. (See Cagetti
and De Nardi [10] for more discussion on the ﬁt of the model and the role of
entrepreneurship in shaping wealth concentration.) To illustrate this feature,
20Table 4 compares some data for the U.S. economy and for the model-generated
data, and Figures 2 and 3 compare the wealth distribution in the data and
in the model, respectively, for the whole population and for the population of
entrepreneurs.
5.1 Policy experiments
Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 report the relevant statistics generated by the bench-
mark calibration for our model economy and the corresponding numbers for
the steady states of various policy experiments.
We use the proportional income tax rate (τs) as a residual to balance the
government budget constraint. When we change a given tax instrument to
study the eﬀects of a policy experiment, τs will typically change, and the
interest rate and the wage will adjust to clear the markets for labor and capital.
To disentangle these eﬀects we report, in some cases, three diﬀerent types
of experiments for a given tax policy. In the ﬁrst type of experiment we
keep prices and τs ﬁxed; that is, we change the relevant tax for the given
policy experiment, but keep the interest rate, the wage, and all other tax rates
constant, thus allowing the government budget to become unbalanced. This
experiment highlights the eﬀect on savings and capital accumulation of the
tax change per se. In the second type of experiment we still keep the interest
rate and the wage constant, but let τs vary in order to balance the government
budget constraint, as if the U.S. economy were a small open economy or faced
a linear technology.4 In the third type of experiment the interest rate and the
wage adjust to clear the markets for capital and labor.
4We consider steady states in which public expenditures and outstanding debt are con-
stant as a fraction of output, so the actual amount of expenditures varies across experiments:
if output decreases, so do public expenditures.
21Since our model does not incorporate the choice of hours worked,5 our
experiments focus on the eﬀects of the tax on occupational choice and on
savings (and thus on business formation).
To measure the long-run6 redistributional costs and beneﬁts of the various
policy experiments, we compute the fraction of yearly consumption that should
be given to each household in the steady state of a given policy experiment
to make the household as well oﬀ as in the steady state of the benchmark
economy. Positive numbers mean that a household loses from moving from the
benchmark economy to the new one; vice versa for negative numbers. All of
the graphs for the long-run welfare costs for the young refer to households with
median labor earnings ability. In all experiments we ﬁnd very little variation
in the welfare costs for the young depending on their labor earnings ability.
5.2 Abolishing the estate tax
Rows 2, 3, and 4 of Table 5 show the eﬀects of abolishing estate taxation, ﬁrst
for ﬁxed prices and other taxes, and then letting taxes balance the government
budget constraint for given prices, and ﬁnally allowing prices to adjust.
Given prices and other taxes, eliminating the estate tax raises the capital-
output ratio and aggregate output by 1.3% and 1.4%, respectively. This,
however, comes at the cost of increased wealth concentration in the hands
of the richest 10% of the people. While the estate tax cut does not change
the total number of entrepreneurs, it does increase the size of the largest es-
tates (net of taxes) left by the richest people, who plan to leave bequests in
5Several works have used dynamic life-cycle models to study the labor supply responses
to taxes (for instance, Altig et al. [4]). These models, however, ignore entrepreneurs.
6It would be interesting to also compute the transitions to the new steady states. Unfor-
tunately, the complexity of the code makes it unfeasible for now.
22K/Y Y Perc. τs Interest Wealth held by top
Entr. rate 1% 5% 10% 20%
Benchmark: 16% estate tax above exemption level
3.00 3.52 10.44 2.22% 5.92% 30.4 61.1 74.8 86.1
No estate tax, ﬁxed prices and other taxes
3.04 3.57 10.45 2.22% 5.92% 31.2 61.8 75.3 86.4
No estate tax, ﬁxed prices, endogenous τs
3.02 3.50 10.40 2.60% 5.92% 31.1 61.7 75.2 86.2
No estate tax, endogenous prices and τs
3.01 3.48 10.36 2.60% 5.90% 31.4 62.0 75.3 86.2
Table 5: Abolishing the estate tax.
amounts greater than the exemption level. This mechanism tends to increase
the wealth holdings of the most successful dynasties and hence increases wealth
concentration.
A lower estate tax generates a fall in government revenues. To balance
the government budget constraint, the proportional part of the income tax
increases from 2.2% to 2.6%. This change aﬀects all of the households in the
economy and, in particular, decreases the return (net of taxes) from investing
in capital for the entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs hit more harshly by this
tax increase are most of the young ones (for which the expected time of death
is still far in the future, and thus the beneﬁts from the elimination of the estate
tax are small) and the old ones who are not rich enough to really beneﬁt from
the abolition of the estate tax. The reduced investment from all of these
23small and medium-sized entrepreneurs is large enough to reverse the gain in
output, which is now half of a percentage point smaller than in the benchmark
case. The fraction of entrepreneurs also decreases slightly. Similar results are
obtained when we endogenize the interest rate because the general equilibrium
eﬀects are relatively small for this policy experiment.
Figures 4 and 5 show the long-run welfare costs and beneﬁts of living in an
economy with no estate taxation (with endogenous prices and τs) for various
households, with positive numbers being losses. The graphs show that the
abolition of the estate tax redistributes wealth from the young to the old and
from the poor to the rich. The young have to hold about $20 million to beneﬁt
from the new system, and even for the richest young the beneﬁt from moving
to an economy with no estate tax is small, of the order of less than 1% of
yearly consumption. The beneﬁts for the old start kicking in for households
with more than $8-10 million (depending on the entrepreneurial ability level)
and ﬂatten out to about 6% of yearly consumption for the richest.
We thus ﬁnd that eliminating the estate tax would have small negative af-
fects on aggregate capital accumulation, would slightly increase wealth inequal-
ity, and would redistribute from the young to the old and from the majority
of poor people to a very small number of rich people.
Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, and R´ ıos-Rull [12] analyze the eﬀects of a similar
reform in a model with no entrepreneurial choice, in which the key force driving
wealth inequality is that the rich are subject to very large idiosyncratic earnings
shocks (which are calibrated to match inequality in wealth holdings). As in
our model, the abolition of the estate tax in their model economy generates
only a small increase in wealth inequality. Contrary to us, they also obtain a
small raise in aggregate output as a result of the reform. The key additional
channel at work in our framework is, as we discussed, the disincentive eﬀect on

















































Figure 4: Consumption compensa-
tion to make the young in the econ-
omy with no estate taxes as well oﬀ
as in the benchmark.















































Figure 5: Consumption compensa-
tion to make the old in the economy
with no estate taxes as well oﬀ as
in the benchmark.
entrepreneurial investment, which is very reactive to changes to return from
entrepreneurial activity net of taxes, which is lower the higher the proportional
income tax.
5.3 Increasing the eﬀective estate tax rate
Row 2 of Table 6 shows the eﬀects of increasing the tax rate on estates from 16%
to 60%, a value close to the statutory tax rate, while keeping the exemption
level ﬁxed. This experiment can be interpreted as a better enforcement of the
existing estate tax system.
To study the steady state eﬀects of this policy, we ﬁrst keep all prices and
taxes ﬁxed at the same level as in the benchmark economy. Raising the estate
tax for the rich reduces the size of the estates that are left to their descendants,
and thus decreases wealth concentration in the upper tail. The amount of net
worth held by the richest 1% and 5% decreases, respectively, from 30.3% to
27.9% and from 61.1% to 58.9%. This reduction, however, comes at a steep
25K/Y Y Perc. τs Interest Wealth held by top
Entr. rate 1% 5% 10% 20%
Benchmark: 16% estate tax above exemption level
3.00 3.52 10.44 2.22% 5.92% 30.4 61.1 74.8 86.1
60% estate tax above exemption level, ﬁxed prices and other taxes
2.90 3.39 10.43 2.22% 5.92% 27.9 58.9 73.3 85.2
60% estate tax above exemption level, ﬁxed prices, endogenous τs
2.97 3.63 10.60 0.90% 5.92% 28.3 59.4 73.8 85.7
60% estate tax above exemption level, endogenous prices and τs
2.95 3.47 10.69 1.71% 6.37% 26.4 57.2 72.1 84.5
Table 6: A higher eﬀective estate tax rate.
cost: a 3.7% decrease in output and 3.3% decrease in the capital-output ratio.
Rows 3 and 4 of Table 6 show the eﬀects of such a policy when we allow
the government budget constraint to balance (thus reducing the equilibrium
income tax) and then for that and also for prices to equal marginal products
(thus increasing the interest rate). In row 3, higher revenues from the estate
tax imply a lower equilibrium income tax (τs decreases from 2.2% to 0.9%),
which in turn increases savings and total output. Output is now higher than
in the benchmark case because the increased investment of those who beneﬁt
from the tax cut is large enough to make up for the fall of investment for the
richest few who face the higher estate tax rate. As a result of this tax cut,
more households ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter entrepreneurship, and the number
of entrepreneurs also increases (from 10.44% to 10.6% of all households).
26Row 4 allows for the prices to adjust; in this case the general equilibrium
eﬀects are large enough to reverse the eﬀects of the reform on the aggregates.
The equilibrium interest is higher: 6.4% compared to 5.9%. A higher interest
rate tends to increase the number of entrepreneurs because workers who have
high ability as entrepreneurs are now saving at a higher return and can thus
enter entrepreneurship more quickly. At the same time a higher interest rate
makes it more costly for the entrepreneurs to borrow and thus reduces their
return from investing. Since there are decreasing returns to the entrepreneurial
technology, this eﬀect is particularly strong for the richer entrepreneurs. A
higher equilibrium interest rate thus reduces the saving rate of the richest
entrepreneurs, hence decreasing wealth concentration. The decrease in wealth
concentration, in turn, decreases the revenues from the estate tax and thus
requires a higher income tax to balance the government’s budget constraint.
In general equilibrium, the reduction in wealth concentration (the richest 1%
now hold 26% rather than 30% of total net worth) thus comes at a non-trivial
cost: aggregate output is 1.4% lower, and the capital-output ratio drops by
1.7%.
Hence, while increasing the estate tax rate above the existing exemption
level tends to reduce wealth inequality, not only the size, but even the sign of
its aggregate eﬀects depend on how much prices respond to the reform.
The reduction of inequality obviously comes at a cost for the very richest.
Figures 6 and 7 show the long-run welfare costs for various households. First
notice that, as in the previous welfare comparison, the old are much more
aﬀected by increases in the estate tax than the young (for which the expected
time of death is much farther in the future): for the richest old the welfare
cost of moving to a higher estate taxation economy are of the order of 30% of
yearly consumption, while for the richest young these welfare costs are of the
27order of 3%. Second, the poorest are better oﬀ because of the reduction of the
income tax and the increase in the interest rate, while the richest are worse
oﬀ because they are most aﬀected by the increase in the estate tax. The gains
of the poorest are much smaller than the losses of the richest. However, the
richest are a very small fraction of the population.


















































Figure 6: Consumption compensa-
tion to make the young in the high
estate tax rate regime (τb=60%
above exemption level) as well oﬀ
as in the benchmark.
















































Figure 7: Consumption compensa-
tion to make the old in the high es-
tate tax rate regime (τb=60% above
exemption level) as well oﬀ as in the
benchmark.
5.4 Changing the exemption level
Table 7 shows the eﬀects of changing the eﬀective exemption level, while keep-
ing the eﬀective estate tax rate at 16%. The ﬁrst experiment drives the ex-
emption level to zero. As a result, all estates are taxed at 16%. This reform
changes wealth inequality very little, but has detrimental eﬀects on aggregate
output and on the capital-output ratio, which are, respectively, 2.8% and 1.0%
lower than in the benchmark economy. If everything else were kept equal, this
reform would increase wealth concentration because it represents a switch from
28K/Y Y Perc. τs Interest Wealth held by top
Entr. rate 1% 5% 10% 20%
Benchmark: 16% estate tax above exemption level
3.00 3.52 10.44 2.22% 5.92% 30.4 61.1 74.8 86.1
16% estate tax, zero exemption level, endogenous prices and τs
2.97 3.42 10.47 1.52% 6.24% 30.5 60.7 74.4 85.6
16% estate tax, higher exemption level (180), endogenous prices and τs
3.00 3.46 10.43 2.44% 6.05% 30.0 60.7 74.5 85.8
Table 7: Changing the exemption level.
progressive to proportional estate taxation. When prices adjust, however, the
interest rate, which is the return from saving for the workers, and the cost of
borrowing for the entrepreneurs, rises. This increase reduces entrepreneurial
investment and thus reduces aggregate output. In the presence of decreas-
ing returns to the entrepreneurial activity, a rise in the interest rate decreases
the investment of the richest entrepreneurs by more than the investment of
the small and medium-sized entrepreneurs. It also reduces their earnings and
wealth holdings, hence reducing wealth concentration in the hands of the rich-
est few. Despite a lower proportional income tax, which tends to increase
workers’ savings and investment, aggregate output and the capital-output ra-
tio decline due to the reduction in investment in the entrepreneurial sector.
Figures 8 and 9 show the long-run welfare costs and beneﬁts for various house-
holds. As a result of the elimination of the estate tax exemption level, all of
the young people are better oﬀ (as a result of the higher interest rate and wage
net of income taxes), while all of the old people who previously were below
29the exemption level now lose, having to pay higher estate taxes. The richest
old, however, beneﬁt from the reform, having to pay the same estate taxes and
fewer income taxes than before.




















































Figure 8: Consumption compensa-
tion to make the young in the no-
exemption estate tax rate regime as
well oﬀ as in the benchmark.


















































Figure 9: Consumption compensa-
tion to make the old in the no-
exemption estate tax rate regime as
well oﬀ as in the benchmark.
The second experiment goes in the opposite direction and increases the
exemption level from 155 to 180 times the average labor income. As a result,
the degree of wealth inequality and the capital-output ratio are basically un-
changed compared to the baseline calibration, while aggregate output is 1.7%
lower. A higher exemption level decreases the revenues from the estate tax and
thus requires an increase in the income tax to balance the government budget
constraint, hence decreasing aggregate output. Figures 10 and 11 display the
long-run welfare costs and beneﬁts for various households in this experiment.
Despite a slight increase in the equilibrium proportional income tax rate, many
of the young workers are better oﬀ as a result of this reform, due to the in-
crease in the rate of return to saving. The young with high entrepreneurial
ability are worse oﬀ, unless they are rich enough (around $8 million): for


















































Figure 10: Consumption compen-
sation to make the young in the
higher-exemption estate tax rate
regime as well oﬀ as in the bench-
mark.
















































Figure 11: Consumption compen-
sation to make the old in the
higher-exemption estate tax rate
regime as well oﬀ as in the bench-
mark.
them an increased interest rate raises the costs of borrowing more than the
expected beneﬁt from an increase in the estate tax exemption. For the young
entrepreneurs who own between $8 and $50 million, the reform constitutes a
wash, while for those who are richer, the beneﬁts outweigh the costs of the
reform. The costs and beneﬁts for the old are larger in magnitude than for the
young, but follow a similar pattern: the low-ability old are better oﬀ because
of the higher interest rate, while the high-ability old, who are entrepreneurs,
trade oﬀ the cost of a higher borrowing rate with the expected beneﬁt of a
lower estate tax burden.
Looking at the overall results of the eﬀects of changing the eﬀective exemp-
tion level (while keeping the estate tax ﬁxed at 16%), we notice that wealth
inequality is roughly unchanged, while the eﬀect on aggregate output is non-
monotonic. Aggregate output is lowest (3.42) at a zero exemption level, rises
to 3.52 at the eﬀective exemption level in our current benchmark (which is
about $5 million), and then falls at an intermediate level between the two
31(2.46) when the exemption level is raised further to about $6 million. Mov-
ing from an exemption of zero to a relatively high one, such as $ 5 million,
insulates most of the businesses from the negative eﬀects of estate taxation,
but increasing the exemption further does not increase investment from very
large business owners that much, while it discourages the savings and invest-
ments of all of the other households who have to pay the higher proportional
income tax that is necessary to balance the government budget in the pres-
ence of a smaller revenue from estate taxes. Intuitively, there should be an
estate-tax exemption level, possibly a high one, that allows redistribution while
keeping the aggregate costs of such redistribution low. (It’s a delicate trade-
oﬀ between the number of people and the elasticity of their responses to tax
changes.) However, if we keep raising this exemption level, there will not be
enough people paying taxes, and we would thus lose the beneﬁts of this par-
ticular form of progressive taxation. Our results seem to indicate that, given
the current eﬀective estate tax rate, the eﬀective exemption level that we have
in the U.S. economy is currently high enough and that raising it further would
not decrease wealth inequality and would instead be detrimental for aggregate
output.
5.5 Income taxes
The preceding experiments have shown the importance of the changes in the
proportional income tax required to balance the government budget constraint.
In this section we focus on the eﬀects of assuming income taxes with diﬀerent
degrees of progressivity. Table 8 displays the results.
In row 2 we set the income tax schedule for the entrepreneurs equal to that
for the workers. Figure 1 shows that in the benchmark calibration the average
32K/Y Y Perc. τs Interest Wealth held by top
Entr. rate 1% 5% 10% 20%
Benchmark: 16% estate tax above exemption level
3.00 3.52 10.44 2.22% 5.92% 30.4 61.1 74.8 86.1
Setting the tax schedule for entrepreneurs equal to the workers’
2.90 3.23 10.35 2.05% 6.24% 26.5 56.7 71.4 83.9
Increasing progressivity (b)
2.97 3.42 10.49 1.70% 6.11% 29.5 56.8 73.7 85.4
Proportional taxation
3.41 4.93 9.1 18.55% 4.38% 39.6 75.0 86.3 97.9
Table 8: Experiments with various degrees of progressivity of the income tax.
tax rate for richer entrepreneurs is smaller than that for workers. This implies
that richer entrepreneurs are now taxed more heavily relative to those in the
lower tail of the distribution. This tax scheme leads to a decline in output and
in the capital-output ratio (by 8.2% and 3.3%, respectively) because higher
taxation discourages the formation of large businesses. As a consequence, it
also decreases the concentration in the top quantiles of the wealth distribution.
Figures 12 and 13 show the long-run welfare costs and beneﬁts for various
households. Both young and old workers beneﬁt from this reform: their long-
run welfare beneﬁts are about 1% of yearly consumption. High-ability workers,
unless they are too poor to become entrepreneurs, are hurt by this policy and
experience a welfare cost of up to 4% for the young and up to 8% for the
old. These welfare costs tend to ﬂatten out or decrease with the wealth level

















































Figure 12: Consumption compen-
sation to make the young in the
same-tax-schedule-for-all economy
as well oﬀ as in the benchmark.















































Figure 13: Consumption compen-
sation to make the old in the
same-tax-schedule-for-all economy
as well oﬀ as in the benchmark.
because the diﬀerence in the slope of the two tax schedules also ﬂattens out
as income increases.
In row 3 of the table, we increase the progressivity of the tax system for
both entrepreneurs and workers by multiplying the parameter b by 1.05 in
Table 9 (which implies a 5% increase in the slope of the average tax schedule).
Higher progressivity hurts capital accumulation and thus decreases output,
while at the same time decreasing wealth concentration. Figures 14 and 15
show the long-run welfare costs and beneﬁts for various households. Higher
progressivity hurts the welfare of both young and old entrepreneurs due to
a decrease in their return net of taxes and to an increase in their cost of
borrowing. In contrast, the reform beneﬁts the workers because of the lower
average tax that they have to pay and the increase in their rate of return from
saving.
Switching to proportional taxation has very large eﬀects, both on wealth
inequality and on the aggregates. This reform increases the capital-output ra-





















































Figure 14: Consumption com-
pensation to make the young
in the more-progressive-taxation
economy as well oﬀ as in the bench-
mark.



















































Figure 15: Consumption compen-
sation to make the old in the more-
progressive-taxation economy as
well oﬀ as in the benchmark.
tio by 13.7% and aggregate output by 40% at the cost of a substantial increase
in wealth concentration: the richest 1% and 20% now hold, respectively, 40%
and 98% of the total net worth. Figures 16 and 17 show the long-run welfare
costs and beneﬁts for various households. Young and old workers both are
worse oﬀ as a result of this reform, due to the increase in the average tax rate
that they pay and to the decrease in their return to saving. Depending on
their wealth level, their welfare cost is of the order of 1% to 0.3% of yearly
consumption. The entrepreneurs are better oﬀ, and the old ones more than
the young.
Meh [29] and Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, and R´ ıos-Rull [11] use diﬀerent
models of wealth inequality to study the eﬀects of switching from progressive to
proportional income taxation. Both papers ﬁnd that this reform would increase
aggregate output by about 5% and raise wealth inequality, with Meh ﬁnding
a smaller increase and Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, and R´ ıos-Rull ﬁnding one
similar to ours. In Meh’s paper, ﬁrm size and hence entrepreneurial investment

















































Figure 16: Consumption compen-
sation to make the young in the
proportional taxation economy as
well oﬀ as in the benchmark.















































Figure 17: Consumption compen-
sation to make the old in the pro-
portional taxation economy as well
oﬀ as in the benchmark.
are linked to an exogenous learning process, which thus limits the response of
entrepreneurial investment to policy changes, while Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez,
and R´ ıos-Rull don’t model the entrepreneurial channel.
6 Conclusions
While almost all of the tax reforms that we consider tend to have small eﬀects
on the total number of households who engage in an entrepreneurial activity,
they do signiﬁcantly aﬀect the saving rate and the capital accumulation of
those households who are entrepreneurs. Tax changes, therefore, can have
large eﬀects either on wealth inequality or on aggregate capital and output or
on all three.
We ﬁnd that abolishing the estate tax would have small eﬀects on wealth
concentration in the hands of the richest few and small, possibly negative
eﬀects on aggregate output. This reform would redistribute from the majority
to the very richest.
36Increasing the estate tax above the current eﬀective exemption level would
be an eﬀective instrument to reduce wealth concentration, but would signiﬁ-
cantly hamper aggregate output and capital formation and would imply large
long-run welfare costs for the richest few who would face the tax increase.
Changes in the exemption level may be as important as changes in the tax
rate. Because few households pay the estate tax under the current system,
an increase in the eﬀective exemption level may end up hitting a much larger
fraction of the population that is aﬀected by an increase in the proportional
income tax. According to our computations, increasing the current eﬀective
exemption level would have negligible eﬀects on inequality and would hurt
output production. In contrast, driving the exemption level to zero would not
signiﬁcantly aﬀect wealth inequality, but would reduce aggregate output. The
eﬀective estate tax system in place might thus be a good compromise between
eﬃciency and redistribution.
Our computations show that even if the estate tax generates just a small
fraction of the total government revenues, it is important to take into account
the change in the income tax required to reestablish budget balance in order
to evaluate the eﬀects of a given tax policy. Letting the income tax adjust can
reverse the eﬀects of an estate tax reform in some cases. While a higher estate
tax tends to hurt above all the wealthy old entrepreneurs, a higher progressive
income tax reduces the incentives to save throughout the wealth distribution,
in particular, for young entrepreneurs who want to increase the size of their
business but face borrowing constraints.
We also ﬁnd that in many reforms it is important to take into account the
general equilibrium eﬀects on prices. For example, an increase in the interest
rate beneﬁts the workers (who save) and tends to hurt the entrepreneurs (who
borrow at that rate). For this reason, changes in prices impact both the
37aggregates and the distribution of wealth holdings.
We also perform various experiments pertaining to the degree of progressiv-
ity of the income tax. Decreasing progressivity can generate large increases in
output, because this stimulates entrepreneurial savings and capital formation,
but at the cost of large increases in wealth concentration.
Our model does not consider tax avoidance costs. Signiﬁcant amounts of
resources might be spent to decrease the tax burden, through the use of lawyers
and accountants. The cost of tax avoidance might generate a deadweight loss
that should be considered in the overall evaluation of any change in the estate
tax. (See Aaron and Munnell [2] and Schmalbeck [37] for a discussion of the
avoidance costs.) This is an important and to a large extent unexplored issue
that we leave for future research.
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41A Income and entrepreneurial ability
We assume that the income process is AR(1) and approximate it with a ﬁve-
point discrete Markov chain, using the method described in Tauchen and
Hussey [40]. The gridpoints y for the income process (normalized to 1) that
we use are
 
0.2468 0.4473 0.7654 1.3097 2.3742
 
and the transition matrix Py is

        

0.7376 0.2473 0.0150 0.0002 0.0000
0.1947 0.5555 0.2328 0.0169 0.0001
0.0113 0.2221 0.5333 0.2221 0.0113
0.0001 0.0169 0.2328 0.5555 0.1947
0.0000 0.0002 0.0150 0.2473 0.7376

        

.






B Federal tax schedules
We estimate equation (1) using nonlinear least squares. The data are for 1989
and are taken from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We use the
PSID data set for this part of our analysis because it asks questions that allow
us to classify households as entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, and, until
1989, it also provides computed data on total taxes paid by the respondents.













Table 9: Estimates for the federal average tax rates.
Our measure of total monetary income includes all forms of labor income,
capital income, transfers, and income from entrepreneurial activities. Total
federal taxes paid is the variable computed in the PSID (in our case, V18862
in the 1990 ﬁle). The dependent variable in the regression, average tax rate,
is the ratio of federal taxes paid to total monetary income.
To obtain a representative sample, we exclude the poverty and Latino sam-
ples. To obtain the appropriate tax rate for our model (in which the lowest
income level is positive), we also drop all observations with income smaller
than $1,000 or negative taxes paid.
To make the data on entrepreneurs consistent with those that we use from
the SCF data set and the model we employ, we deﬁne as entrepreneurs those
who declare to be self-employed and own or have a ﬁnancial interest in a busi-
43ness activity and had an income of at least $1,000 from running the business
during the period. The resulting sample of entrepreneurs has very similar char-
acteristics to those from the SCF. Our estimates would be very similar if we
were to assume a somewhat smaller or larger cutoﬀ for the amount of business
income received during the period.
We perform the estimation on three samples: the whole population of
households, including workers and entrepreneurs, the subpopulation of workers
only, and the subpopulation of entrepreneurs only. The estimated values for
the three groups are shown in Table 9 and plotted in Figure 1.
C The algorithm
The algorithm proceeds as follows:
• Fix an interest rate ¯ r and wage rate w. Taking ¯ r and w as given, solve
for the value functions using value function iteration.
• Construct the transition matrix M. Compute the associated invariant
distribution of wealth.
• Compute total savings and total capital invested in the two sectors im-
plied by the invariant distribution.
• Iterate on τs until the government budget constraint is satisﬁed.
• Iterate on ¯ r and w until prices are equal to marginal productivities.
The computation of the value functions is nonstandard because of the pres-
ence of the endogenous borrowing constraints. For each state x, the endogenous
44borrowing constraint speciﬁes a maximum amount ˆ k(x) that an entrepreneur
can borrow. The speciﬁc function ˆ k depends, however, on the value functions
themselves. In the algorithm we exploit the fact that, for a given set of state
variables, if an entrepreneur runs away with a given level of capital ˜ k, he would
also run away with any ˜ k +ǫ, where ǫ ≥ 0. We adopt the following algorithm:
initialize ˆ k(x) = kmax, the maximum investment level in the economy. We solve
the value functions, iterating until convergence, conditional on this borrowing
constraint. For each value of x, we compare the value function associated with
remaining an entrepreneur and repaying the debt with the value function asso-
ciated with default; we ﬁnd the maximum level of investment (and borrowing)
for which the entrepreneur would not default and set the new ˆ k(x) to this new
value, and we compute again the value functions conditional on this updated
constraint. This procedure is iterated until ˆ k does not change across iterations.
Because we do not constrain the ˆ k(x) functions to be decreasing when
we iterate on them, we are not imposing convergence. Together with the
initialization of these functions at the maximum possible level of borrowing,
this implies that if the model has more than one solution, and if the algorithm
converges monotonically, then we converge to the “best” solution, that is, the
one that allows for the borrowing in the economy. In all of our simulations the
algorithm did converge monotonically.
451 
Working Paper Series 
 
A series of research studies on regional economic issues relating to the Seventh Federal 
Reserve District, and on financial and economic topics. 
 
A Proposal for Efficiently Resolving Out-of-the-Money Swap Positions   WP-03-01 
at Large Insolvent Banks 
George G. Kaufman 
 
Depositor Liquidity and Loss-Sharing in Bank Failure Resolutions  WP-03-02 
George G. Kaufman 
 
Subordinated Debt and Prompt Corrective Regulatory Action  WP-03-03 
Douglas D. Evanoff and Larry D. Wall 
 
When is Inter-Transaction Time Informative?  WP-03-04 
Craig Furfine 
 
Tenure Choice with Location Selection: The Case of Hispanic Neighborhoods  WP-03-05 
in Chicago  
Maude Toussaint-Comeau and Sherrie L.W. Rhine 
 
Distinguishing Limited Commitment from Moral Hazard in Models of  WP-03-06 
Growth with Inequality* 
Anna L. Paulson and Robert Townsend 
 
Resolving Large Complex Financial Organizations  WP-03-07 
Robert R. Bliss 
 
The Case of the Missing Productivity Growth:  WP-03-08 
Or, Does information technology explain why productivity accelerated in the United States 
but not the United Kingdom? 
Susanto Basu, John G. Fernald, Nicholas Oulton and Sylaja Srinivasan 
 
Inside-Outside Money Competition  WP-03-09 
Ramon Marimon, Juan Pablo Nicolini and Pedro Teles 
 
The Importance of Check-Cashing Businesses to the Unbanked: Racial/Ethnic Differences  WP-03-10 
William H. Greene, Sherrie L.W. Rhine and Maude Toussaint-Comeau 
 
A Firm’s First Year  WP-03-11 
Jaap H. Abbring and Jeffrey R. Campbell 
 
Market Size Matters  WP-03-12 
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Hugo A. Hopenhayn 
 
The Cost of Business Cycles under Endogenous Growth  WP-03-13 
Gadi Barlevy 
 
The Past, Present, and Probable Future for Community Banks  WP-03-14 
Robert DeYoung, William C. Hunter and Gregory F. Udell 2 
Working Paper Series (continued)  
 
Measuring Productivity Growth in Asia: Do Market Imperfections Matter?  WP-03-15 
John Fernald and Brent Neiman 
 
Revised Estimates of Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United States  WP-03-16 
Bhashkar Mazumder 
 
Product Market Evidence on the Employment Effects of the Minimum Wage  WP-03-17 
Daniel Aaronson and Eric French 
 
Estimating Models of On-the-Job Search using Record Statistics  WP-03-18 
Gadi Barlevy 
 
Banking Market Conditions and Deposit Interest Rates   WP-03-19 
Richard J. Rosen 
 
Creating a National State Rainy Day Fund: A Modest Proposal to Improve Future   WP-03-20 
State Fiscal Performance  
Richard Mattoon 
 
Managerial Incentive and Financial Contagion   WP-03-21 
Sujit Chakravorti and Subir Lall 
 
Women and the Phillips Curve: Do Women’s and Men’s Labor Market Outcomes   WP-03-22 
Differentially Affect Real Wage Growth and Inflation? 
Katharine Anderson, Lisa Barrow and Kristin F. Butcher 
 
Evaluating the Calvo Model of Sticky Prices  WP-03-23 
Martin Eichenbaum and Jonas D.M. Fisher 
 
The Growing Importance of Family and Community: An Analysis of Changes in the  WP-03-24 
Sibling Correlation in Earnings 
Bhashkar Mazumder and David I. Levine 
 
Should We Teach Old Dogs New Tricks? The Impact of Community College Retraining  WP-03-25 
on Older Displaced Workers 
Louis Jacobson, Robert J. LaLonde and Daniel Sullivan 
 
Trade Deflection and Trade Depression   WP-03-26 
Chad P. Brown and Meredith A. Crowley 
 
China and Emerging Asia: Comrades or Competitors?   WP-03-27 
Alan G. Ahearne, John G. Fernald, Prakash Loungani and John W. Schindler 
 
International Business Cycles Under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes   WP-03-28 
Michael A. Kouparitsas 
 
Firing Costs and Business Cycle Fluctuations   WP-03-29 
Marcelo Veracierto 
 
Spatial Organization of Firms   WP-03-30 
Yukako Ono 
 
Government Equity and Money: John Law’s System in 1720 France   WP-03-31 
François R. Velde 
 3 
Working Paper Series (continued)  
 
Deregulation and the Relationship Between Bank CEO   WP-03-32 
Compensation and Risk-Taking 
Elijah Brewer III, William Curt Hunter and William E. Jackson III 
 
Compatibility and Pricing with Indirect Network Effects: Evidence from ATMs   WP-03-33 
Christopher R. Knittel and Victor Stango 
 
Self-Employment as an Alternative to Unemployment   WP-03-34 
Ellen R. Rissman 
 
Where the Headquarters are – Evidence from Large Public Companies 1990-2000   WP-03-35 
Tyler Diacon and Thomas H. Klier 
 
Standing Facilities and Interbank Borrowing: Evidence from the Federal Reserve’s   WP-04-01 
New Discount Window  
Craig Furfine 
 
Netting, Financial Contracts, and Banks: The Economic Implications   WP-04-02 
William J. Bergman, Robert R. Bliss, Christian A. Johnson and George G. Kaufman 
 
Real Effects of Bank Competition   WP-04-03 
Nicola Cetorelli 
 
Finance as a Barrier To Entry: Bank Competition and Industry Structure in   WP-04-04 
Local U.S. Markets? 
Nicola Cetorelli and Philip E. Strahan 
 
The Dynamics of Work and Debt   WP-04-05 
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Zvi Hercowitz 
 
Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of 9/11   WP-04-06 
Jonas Fisher and Martin Eichenbaum 
 
Merger Momentum and Investor Sentiment: The Stock Market Reaction 
To Merger Announcements   WP-04-07 
Richard J. Rosen 
 
Earnings Inequality and the Business Cycle   WP-04-08 
Gadi Barlevy and Daniel Tsiddon 
 
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets:  The Case of Payment Networks  WP-04-09 
Sujit Chakravorti and Roberto Roson 
 
Nominal Debt as a Burden on Monetary Policy   WP-04-10 
Javier Díaz-Giménez, Giorgia Giovannetti, Ramon Marimon, and Pedro Teles 
 
On the Timing of Innovation in Stochastic Schumpeterian Growth Models   WP-04-11 
Gadi Barlevy 
 
Policy Externalities: How US Antidumping Affects Japanese Exports to the EU WP-04-12 
Chad P. Bown and Meredith A. Crowley 
 
Sibling Similarities, Differences and Economic Inequality WP-04-13 
Bhashkar Mazumder 4 
Working Paper Series (continued)  
 
Determinants of Business Cycle Comovement: A Robust Analysis WP-04-14 
Marianne Baxter and Michael A. Kouparitsas 
 
The Occupational Assimilation of Hispanics in the U.S.: Evidence from Panel Data WP-04-15 
Maude Toussaint-Comeau  
 
Reading, Writing, and Raisinets
1: Are School Finances Contributing to Children’s Obesity? WP-04-16 
Patricia M. Anderson and Kristin F. Butcher  
 
Learning by Observing: Information Spillovers in the Execution and Valuation WP-04-17 
of Commercial Bank M&As 
Gayle DeLong and Robert DeYoung 
 
Prospects for Immigrant-Native Wealth Assimilation:  WP-04-18 
Evidence from Financial Market Participation 
Una Okonkwo Osili and Anna Paulson 
 
Individuals and Institutions:  Evidence from International Migrants in the U.S.  WP-04-19 
Una Okonkwo Osili and Anna Paulson 
 
Are Technology Improvements Contractionary?  WP-04-20 
Susanto Basu, John Fernald and Miles Kimball 
 
The Minimum Wage, Restaurant Prices and Labor Market Structure  WP-04-21 
Daniel Aaronson, Eric French and James MacDonald 
 
Betcha can’t acquire just one: merger programs and compensation  WP-04-22 
Richard J. Rosen 
 
Not Working: Demographic Changes, Policy Changes,  WP-04-23 
and the Distribution of Weeks (Not) Worked 
Lisa Barrow and Kristin F. Butcher 
 
The Role of Collateralized Household Debt in Macroeconomic Stabilization  WP-04-24 
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Zvi Hercowitz 
 
Advertising and Pricing at Multiple-Output Firms: Evidence from U.S. Thrift Institutions  WP-04-25 
Robert DeYoung and Evren Örs 
 
Monetary Policy with State Contingent Interest Rates  WP-04-26 
Bernardino Adão, Isabel Correia and Pedro Teles 
 
Comparing location decisions of domestic and foreign auto supplier plants  WP-04-27 
Thomas Klier, Paul Ma and Daniel P. McMillen 
 
China’s export growth and US trade policy  WP-04-28 
Chad P. Bown and Meredith A. Crowley 
 
Where do manufacturing firms locate their Headquarters?  WP-04-29 
J. Vernon Henderson and Yukako Ono 
 
Monetary Policy with Single Instrument Feedback Rules  WP-04-30 
Bernardino Adão, Isabel Correia and Pedro Teles 5 
Working Paper Series (continued)  
 
Firm-Specific Capital, Nominal Rigidities and the Business Cycle  WP-05-01 
David Altig, Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum and Jesper Linde 
 
Do Returns to Schooling Differ by Race and Ethnicity?  WP-05-02 
Lisa Barrow and Cecilia Elena Rouse 
 
Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout  WP-05-03 
Robert R. Bliss and George G. Kaufman 
 
Risk Overhang and Loan Portfolio Decisions  WP-05-04 
Robert DeYoung, Anne Gron and Andrew Winton 
 
Characterizations in a random record model with a non-identically distributed initial record  WP-05-05 
Gadi Barlevy and H. N. Nagaraja 
 
Price discovery in a market under stress: the U.S. Treasury market in fall 1998  WP-05-06 
Craig H. Furfine and Eli M. Remolona 
 
Politics and Efficiency of Separating Capital and Ordinary Government Budgets  WP-05-07 
Marco Bassetto with Thomas J. Sargent 
 
Rigid Prices: Evidence from U.S. Scanner Data  WP-05-08 
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Benjamin Eden 
 
Entrepreneurship, Frictions, and Wealth  WP-05-09 
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi 
 
Wealth inequality: data and models  WP-05-10 
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi 
 
What Determines Bilateral Trade Flows?  WP-05-11 
Marianne Baxter and Michael A. Kouparitsas 
 
Intergenerational Economic Mobility in the U.S., 1940 to 2000  WP-05-12 
Daniel Aaronson and Bhashkar Mazumder  
 
Differential Mortality, Uncertain Medical Expenses, and the Saving of Elderly Singles  WP-05-13 
Mariacristina De Nardi, Eric French, and John Bailey Jones 
 
Fixed Term Employment Contracts in an Equilibrium Search Model  WP-05-14 
Fernando Alvarez and Marcelo Veracierto 
 
Causality, Causality, Causality: The View of Education Inputs and Outputs from Economics  WP-05-15 
Lisa Barrow and Cecilia Elena Rouse 
 
 6 
Working Paper Series (continued)  
 
Competition in Large Markets  WP-05-16 
Jeffrey R. Campbell 
 
Why Do Firms Go Public?  Evidence from the Banking Industry  WP-05-17 
Richard J. Rosen, Scott B. Smart and Chad J. Zutter 
 
Clustering of Auto Supplier Plants in the U.S.: GMM Spatial Logit for Large Samples  WP-05-18 
Thomas Klier and Daniel P. McMillen 
 
Why are Immigrants’ Incarceration Rates So Low? 
Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation  WP-05-19 
Kristin F. Butcher and Anne Morrison Piehl 
 
The Incidence of Inflation: Inflation Experiences by Demographic Group: 1981-2004  WP-05-20 
Leslie McGranahan and Anna Paulson 
 
Universal Access, Cost Recovery, and Payment Services  WP-05-21 
Sujit Chakravorti, Jeffery W. Gunther, and Robert R. Moore 
 
Supplier Switching and Outsourcing  WP-05-22 
Yukako Ono and Victor Stango 
 
Do Enclaves Matter in Immigrants’ Self-Employment Decision?  WP-05-23 
Maude Toussaint-Comeau 
 
The Changing Pattern of Wage Growth for Low Skilled Workers  WP-05-24 
Eric French, Bhashkar Mazumder and Christopher Taber 
 
U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: An Economic Comparison and Evaluation  WP-06-01 
Robert R. Bliss and George G. Kaufman 
 
Redistribution, Taxes, and the Median Voter  WP-06-02 
Marco Bassetto and Jess Benhabib 
 
Identification of Search Models with Initial Condition Problems  WP-06-03 
Gadi Barlevy and H. N. Nagaraja 
 
Tax Riots  WP-06-04 
Marco Bassetto and Christopher Phelan 
 
The Tradeoff between Mortgage Prepayments and Tax-Deferred Retirement Savings  WP-06-05 
Gene Amromin, Jennifer Huang,and Clemens Sialm 
 
Why are safeguards needed in a trade agreement?  WP-06-06 
Meredith A. Crowley 7 
Working Paper Series (continued)  
 
Taxation, Entrepreneurship, and Wealth  WP-06-07 
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi 